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RECENT CASES.
AGENCY-RATIFICATION-An assistant to a city engineer placed his motor-
cycle in the yard of the plaintiff's father while he went to telephone a truckman
to deliver a number of manhole covers, which, however, had been previously
ordered by a city official. During his absence his motorcycle fell and broke the
plaintiff's leg. Held: In ordering the covers the assistant acted as a. mere
volunteer and the subsequent payment of the trucknan's charge by the city was
not a ratification. Keedy v. Inhabitants of Amherst, lO9 N. E. 817 (Mass.
1915).
Where one adopts the unauthorized act of another who has purported to
act in his behalf, he will be deemed to have assumed responsibility therefor
by the well-known principle of ratification. This doctrine is not confined to
acts arising from contractual dealings, but, as is indicated in the principal
case, applies as well to acts which result in or are founded upon a tort.
Dempsey v. Chambers, 154 Mass. 330 (189o); National Ins. Co. v. Minch,
53 N. Y. 144 (1873) ; Lane v. Black, 21 W. Va. 617 (1882). Ratification need
not be made expressly, but will be implied from conduct. Campbell v. Mil-
lar, 84 Ill. App. 2o8 (1899); Hartlove v. Fait Co., 89 Md. 254 (1899). Except
in those cases where the principal intentionally assumes responsibility with-
out inquiry, a ratification is not binding unless made with a full and complete
knowledge of all the material facts. Manning v. Leland, 153 Mass. 51o
(189i); Pittsburg Mining Co. v. Scully, 145 Mich. 229 (i9o6). If an act
done or a contract entered into by one person in behalf of another is illegal
and void, it cannot be ratified. Shepardson v. Gillette, 133 Ind. 125 (1892) ;
Spence v. Cotton Mills Co., 115 N. C. 210 (1894); Building and Loan Assn.
v. Walton, 181 Pa. 201 (1897). If the principal did not have such an interest
in the subject matter of the transaction as would have enabled him personally
to do the act, or if he has since parted with such interest, then he is power-
less to ratify the act of the agent. Krumdick v. White, 1o7 Cal. 37 (1895);
Upton v. Dennis, 133 Mich. 238 (1903).
When one discovers that there have come into his hands the proceeds
of an unauthorized act done in his behalf, it is his duty to return such pro-
ceeds as far as possible, and a failure to do so will be considered a ratification
of the act. Disbrow v. Secor, 58 Conn. 35 (1889) ; Coykendall v. Constable,
99 N. Y. 309 (1885). He must repudiate such act within a reasonable time,
Whitley v. James, 121 Ga. 521 (i9o4) ; Wright v. Baynton, 37 N. H. 9 (1858) ;
but silence or delay in not repudiating does not in all cases amount to ratifica-
tion, Dugan v. Lyman, 23 At. 657 (N. J. 1892) ; Dean v. Gray Bros., io9 Cal.
433 (1895); unless the rights of innocent third parties have been prejudiced,
Smith v. Fletcher, 75 Minn. 189 (1889); Norden v. Duke, 12o N. Y. i (19o7).
ASSAULT AND BATTERY-DEFENSE OF PROPERTY-ATTACHMENT-An owner
of goods in order to maintain possession of them assaulted a constable who
had seized them under an attachment as the property of another. Held:
He was guilty of an assault and battery. State v. Selengut, 95 AtI. 5o3 (R. I.
1915).
The principal case is in accord with those cases which hold that where
an officer attempts to take goods belonging to one person, and in his posses-
sion, upon a writ against another person, the one in rightful possession of
the goods has no legal right to defend such possession against the officer by
force. State v. Downer, 8 Vt. 424 (1836) ; State v. Richardson, 38 N. H.
2o8 (1859) ; People v. Hall, 38 N. Y. 404 (1884). But in some states it has
been held that the rightful owner of goods is warranted in maintaining his
possession by force against the officer, under such circumstances, in the same
manner as he might against a trespasser. Smith v. State, 105 Ala. 136 (1894) ;
Wentworth v. People, 5 IIl. 550 (1843); Comn. v. Kennard, 8 Pick. 133
(Mass. 1829). The latter decisions have been criticised by those courts
maintaining the contrary doctrine as laying down an unsafe and impracti-
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cable rule, having a tendency to promote disturbances of the peace. State v.Richardson, supra. Of course if the person making the seizure is not aduly authorized officer, the owner may use as much force as necessary toretain possession of his property. State v. Briggs, 25 N. C. 357 (1843).
ATTORNEY AND CLiENT-SuBsTITUTION OF ATTOREY-The plaintiff em-ployed an attorney for a contingent fee, who in good faith but withoutauthority arranged for a settlement, whereupon the litigant applied for thesubstitution of another attorney. Held: The application should be grantedwithout prejudice to the first attorney's claim under the contract for com-pensation. Friedman v. Mindlin, 155 N. Y. S. 295 (1915).A client has a right to change his attorney at any stage in the proceed-ing. New York Phonograph Co. v. Edison Phonograph Co., i5o Fed. 233(1907); Crosby & Fordyce v. Hatch, 135 N. W. 1079 (Iowa 1912). Thisrule applies where the retired attorney is employed for a contingent fee.Gage v. Atwater, 136 Cal. 17o (1902) ; Du Bois v. City of New York, 134 Fed.570 (I9o4). But it has been held, where the litigant had not paid his solicitor,that it was improper for the court to order substitution, without any causehaving been shown other than a disagreement as to the amount of the fee.Lanagan v. Codd, 136 N. W. 398 (Mich. 1912). If the client has conveyed tothe attorney an interest in the cause of action, such that there was a powercoupled with an interest, the contract is not revocable at will. Gulf, etc., Co.v. Miller, 21 Tex. Civ. App. 6og (I899). However, the conveyance to anattorney of part of a piece of land, the title to which is in dispute, does notpreclude the substitution of an attorney in case of neglect to prosecute.People ex rel. Downer v. Norton, 16 Cal. 436 (186o). An order of courtsubstituting one attorney for another has no effect upon the latter's legalrights under the contract, other than the right to continue in the case. Rootv. McIlvaine, 22 Ky. L. 7 (9oo). •The order of substitution should provide for the first attorney's com-pensation. Naiburg v. Goldin, 149 N. Y. S. 495 (1914). While it has beenheld that where an attorney is substituted the first can recover only for dis-bursements and services rendered, Parish v. McGowan, 39 App. D. C. 184(1913) ; De Angelis v. Bank for Savings, 132 N. Y. S. 295 (I9n), there arecases in which he was allowed to recover the percentage agreed upon. MacKiev. Howland, 3 App. D. C. 461 (1894); Carlisle v. Barnes, 1O2 App. Div. 573(N. Y. 19o5). Where the fee is contingent some courts assure a lien upon theultimate judgment, and secure immediate reimbursement of expenses in-curred. Carver v. United States, 7 Ct. Cl. 499 (1871) ; Ronald v. Mutual etc.Ass'n, 3o Fed. 228 (1887).
BANKS AND BANKING-CASHIER's AUTHORITY TO IssuE DaRFTrs-Acashier drew a draft on another bank without authority. Held: The bankwas liable. Pemiscot Bank v. Central State Bank, 177 S. W. 74 (Tenn.
1915).A bank can act only through its agents, and since they are held out tothe public as having authority to act according to the general usage andcustom of the business, the acts of a cashier within the scope of that businesswill generally bind the bank in favor of third persons. Wakefield Bank v.Truesdell, 55 Barb. 602 (N. Y. 1864); McBoyle v. Union Bank, 122 Pac. 458(Cal. 1912). A cashier must also be held to possess such other authority ashe is held out to possess, and the bank is bound by acts within his apparentauthority. Pattison v. Syracuse Bank, 8o N. Y. 82 (i88o) ; National Bank v.Equitable Trust Co., 223 Pa. 328 (io9). Secret instructions will not availthe bank as against third persons without notice. Nat. Bank v. Nat Bank,116 Ala. 52o (1897). But the general authority of a cashier does not author-ize him to issue drafts of the bank for himself or for his private use.Lamson v. Beard, 94 Fed. 30 (I899) ; Mendel v. Boyd, 71 Neb. 657 (I9O4) ;Trust Co. v. Stallo, 147 N. Y. S. 493 (914). So a creditor taking a draftdrawn to the cashier's own order, does so at his own risk and is put on
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notice that the fiduciary is discharging his own obligation. Gale v. Chase
Bank, IO4 Fed. 214 (igoo). For a criticism of this doctrine of constructive
notice and the resulting burden on commercial paper, see in addition to the
principal case, Goshen Bank v. State, 141 N. Y. 37g (I894).
BILLS AND NOTES-PAYEE A "HOLDER IN DUE COURsE--A debtor deliv-
ered his note, payable to a third person and subject to certain equities, to
his credifor, who transferred it to the payee, without notice of the equities,
in part satisfaction of a claim. Held: The payee was a holder of the note
"in due course." Brown v. Rowan, 154 N. Y. Supp. io98 (i915).
Where a negotiable instrument is transferred before its maturity, in
payment of a pre-existing debt, the transferee is a holder for value, and
takes the paper free from the equities existing between the parties. This is
the rule both at common law, Blanchard v. Stevens, 3 Cush. 162 (Mass.
1849) ; and under the Negotiable Instruments Law. Broderick Rope Co. v.
McGrath, 142 N. Y. Supp. 497 (i1q3). The majority rule at common law is,
that the holder of a negotiable promissory note, taken as collateral security
for a pre-existing debt, is a holder for value in due course. Straughan v.
Fairchild, 8o Ind. 598 (188i). This rule is followed by those states which
have adopted the Negotiable Instruments Law, even though they previously
followed the minority rule, that such a holder was not a holder for value.
In re Hopper Morgan Co., 154 Fed. 249 (I9O7) ; Brooks v. Sullivan, 129 N. C.
i9o (igoI). See also I Amer. & Eng. Cases 272. The payee of a negotiable
promissory note may be a holder in due course, and claim the protection
accorded any other bona fide holder for value, both at common law, Watson
v. Russell, 5 B. & S. 968 (Eng. 1864) ; and under the Negotiable Instruments
Law. Boston Steel Co. v. Steuer, 183 Mass. i4o (I9O3).
BILLS AND NOTES-PRoMISSORY NoTE-CoNvERsIoN OF COLLATERAL AND
LIABIITIES OF PARTIEs-Following the conversion of bonds by the payee of
a promissory note the sale netting more than the amount of the note in
security of which they were pledged as collateral, the maker was sued on
the original note. Held: The maker was entitled to have the proceeds used
for the payment of the note. Wagner v. Kohn, 225 Fed. 718 (1915).
The rule of procedure in a majority of states permits the pledgor to
take the conversion of the collateral as a defense by way of counterclaim to
an action of debt on the note. Stearns v. Marsh, 4 Denio 227 (N. Y. 1847).
Where the pledgor sues in trover for conversion and the debt is still unpaid
the rule is that the pledgee may have the amount of his debt recouped in the
damages. Jarvis v. Rogers, I5 Mass. 389 (1819). It has been held that the
same principle should be applied when the pledgee sues after the conversion.
Donnell v. Wyckoff, 49 N. J. L. 48 (i886). This reasoning and authority
was cited and followed in the principal case. The opposite view is that the
debt is a complete contract independent of the pledge and not being the same
transaction recoupment cannot be allowed. Savings Bank v. Jackson, 67 Me.
570 (1878). Reference was made in the principal case to the two views on the
return of collateral securities upon payment of the principal note, though it
was unnecessary for a decision. The common law rule is that such return of
the security is not a condition to be performed before or concurrently with
the payment Scott v. Parker, I Q. B. 8o9 (Eng. 1841) ; Moores v. Woods, 5
N. H. _-97 (I830); Chapman v. Clough, 6 Vt. 123 (1834). It has been held
that even a promise not to sue before surrendering the securities will not
bar a suit by the creditor still in possession of the collateral. Foster v.
Purdy, 5 Metc. 442 (Mass. 1843). It has been held that bringing action is
clearly permissible, since a judgment is not payment-the debt still remains,
only in a new form, and the pledge need not be surrendered. Donnell v.
Wyckoff (supra). Under the opposite view a refusal to return the collat-
eral is a justification for non-payment of the note. Schlesinger v. Wise, 94
N. Y. S. 718 (I95). It has been held that the agreement is implied to
restore the collateral on, and simultaneous with, payment of the note. It is
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on the same ground with surrender of the cancelled note. Ocean Bank v.
Fant, 5o N. Y. 474 (1872). In bringing action the collateral must either be
produced or satisfactorily accounted for and it is of no avail that the collateral
has subsequently become worthless. Stuart v. Bigler's Assignees, 98 Pa. 8o
(,88i).
CAuu.s-D TY To Hou TRsjN-Is ONE WHao AssisTs ANoTHER AwAnR.
A TamIN A PASSENGER?-A party who had boarded a train to assist passen-
gers to a seat without notifying the conductor, was injured in alighting after
the train had started. Held: Such a person is not a passenger and cannot
recover. Ft Worth & D. C. Rwy. Co. v. Allen, I79 S. W. 62 (Texas 1915).
The general rule is that when one assists a passenger aboard a train,
not intending to become a passenger himself but rather to leave the train
after rendering such aid, no duty arises on the carrier's part to hold the
train unless knowledge of such purpose has been communicated to its servant.
Seaboard Air Line v. Bradley, 125 Ga. 193 (Igo6). This rule applies irre-
spective of the time of the stop made at the station. Dunne v. N. Y. N. H.
& H. R. Co., 91 N. Y. Sup. 145 (i9o4). This was extended in the principal
case to where the train failed to remain even for its usual scheduled stopping
time. It has been held that even the failure of the carrier itself to offer
assistance may be too remote to cause the duty to arise. Flaherty v. B. & M.
R. R. Co., 186 Mass. 567 (i9o4). But of course, though not possessing the
rights of a passenger, one who assists is entitled to demand ordinary care
for his protection. Railway Co. v. Lawton, i8 S. W. 543 (Ark. 1892). Where
the carrier has either actual or constructive notice that one has entered to
assist, the duty arises to allow reasonable time for such person to alight
Lucas v. N. B. & T. R. R. Co., 6 Gray (Mass.) 64 (i856). But it has been
held to be no part of the conductor's duty to listen to the conversation of
persons entering or to take notice of what they say. Berry v. Louisville &
N. R. Co., iog Ky. 727 (i9oi). Nor need he forbear from signaling train
to proceed upon seeing one walking in the aisle, or even coming out on the
platform after aiding a passenger. Dunne v. R. R. Co., supra. In such
situation a suggestion as to how to alight where the person is determined
to get off is not construed as an invitation. Flaherty v. B. & M. R. R. Co.,
supra. Knowledge is generally held to be communicated when assistance is
rendered an invalid passenger, L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Crunk, II9 Ind. 542
(I889) ; and here it is the conductor's duty to use ordinary care to ascertain
whether the one assisting has alighted. Bishop v. Illinois Central, 77 S. W.
1099 (Ky. 1904).
CARRiERs-LABILITY FOR INJURY To Lvn STOCK-PRESUMTIoN OF NE.C,
LIGENcE-Where two horses were found dead at the termination of a ship-
ment the shipper could only show delivery in good condition and no evidence
that the condition was attributable to the carrier. Held: Negligence of the
carrier could not be presumed. Hall v. Penna. R. R. Co., 6o Pa. Super. Ct.
235 (1915).
The jurisdictions differ on this question of presumption of negligence
and burden of proof. In England the shipper must affirmatively show the
carrier's negligence. Smith v. Midland R. R. Co., 57 L. T. (N. S.) 813 (1887).
The American courts note a distinction between live stock committed exclu-
sively to the carrier's care and that shipped under a contract by which the
owner, in person or by agent, accompanies the stock. Chicago etc. R. R. Co.,
v. Williams, 6I Neb. 6o8 (igoi). In the latter case the rule is that the carrier
must first be proven negligent. St. Louis R. Co. v. Weakly, 5o Ark. 397 (i887).
It has been held that this is because the stock is not in the carrier's exclusive
custody. Terre Haute R. Co. v. Sherwood, 132 Ind. 129 (1892). Where
stock is unaccompanied, loss or injury puts the burden of proof upon the
carrier. Burke v. U. S. Express Co., 87 Ill. App. 5o5 (1899).
The question of when there is an injury and what constitutes such is
determinative of the presumption of negligence. The shipper must establish
the injury before the carrier need rebut the presumption. Hussey v. Sara-
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gossa, 3 Woods 380 (U. S. 1876); Penna. R. R. Co. v. Raiordon, iig Pa. 577
(x848). This latter case was held to govern the principal case. It has been
held the presumption will not be indulged where the proof adduced excludes
the idea that the accident was due in whole or in part to any other cause than
an inherent vice. Thomas v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 95 S. W. 724 (Texas
i9o6). It has been held that no presumption is raised where the injury oi-
curred in consequence of the "vitality of the freight." Hayman v. R. R. Co.,
8 N. Y. S. Rep. 86 (886). Negligence is still presumed even if it might
have been due to an act of God so long as it might also have resulted as
well through the carrier's fault. Lindsley v. Chicago R. Co., 36 Minn. 539
(1887).
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DEciSIoN OF SUPR FE COURT BINDING ON STATE
COURT-A state supreme court held a state statute void, which was partially
in conflict with a previous federal statute. The United States Supreme Court
later interpreted the federal statute contrary to the judgment of the state
court. Held: The state court should follow the judgment of the Supreme
Court, notwithstanding the rule of stare decisis. Berkshire County v. Cande,
iog N. E. 838 (Mass. 1915).
A state supreme court is not bound by the decision of the Supreme Court
except in cases, where the judgment might be reviewed, as arising under the
Constitution and laws of the United States. Elliott v. Superior Court of San
Bernardino Co., 145 Pac. ioi (Cal. 1915); Stevens & Russell v. St. Louis
Ry. Co., 178 S. W. 8io (Tex. I915). It is well settled that in such a case the
rule of stare decisis does not apply. Moss & Bro. v. Ramey, 136 Pac. 6o8
(Idaho 1913); Dooley v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 79 S. E. 970 (N. Car.
1913); Bartles Northern Oil Co. v. Jackman, I5o N. W. 576 (N. Dak. x915).
It is also a well-settled principle of constitutional law in the interpretation of
statutes, that one part of a statute may be contrary to the Constitution while
the rest may stand as valid, if its provisions are separable and independent
of each other. People v. Van De Carr, 86 N. Y. Supp. 644 (I9O4) ; Com. v.
Shaleen, 30 Pa. Super. Ct. I (io5). Thus in the principal case those parts of
the state statute, not in conflict with the federal statute, had the full forcw
of law.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-EX Post Facto Law--A statute provided that no
person should be eligible to the office of city commissioner who should have
held such office for three consecutive years within the four years preceding
the date of election. Held: This was not an ex post facto law. State v,.
Teasley, 69 So. 723 (Ala. 1915).
The principal case is in accord with the general rule that an ex post facto
law must be one which imposes a punishment for an act which was not pun-
ishable when it was committed and imposes additional punishment, or changes
the rules of evidence by which less or different testimony is sufficient to
convict. Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386 (U. S. 1798) ; State v. Malloy, 78 S. E.
995 (S. C. 1913); Comm. v. Phelps, 96 N. E. 349 (Mass. 1911). The consti-
tutional provision against such laws is applicable only to penal or criminal
cases. De Pass v. Bidwell, 124 Fed. 615 (190o); Pittsburg & St L. Ry. Co. v.
Lightheiser, 78 N. E. 1033 (Ind. i9o6); Eckles v. Wood, 136 S. W. 907 (Ky.
1911). A statute altering the compensation of public officers is not an ex
post facto law. Comm. v. Bailey, 81 Ky. 395 (1883). The provision does not
apply to an employers' liability act. Pittsburg and St. L. Ry. Co. v. Light-
heiser, supra.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-SUIT AGAINST A STATE-NOMINAL PARTIES-Mem-
bers of the State Banking Board and the Bank Commissioner of Oklahoma
were sued by a corporation of the state of Maine, depositors in an Oklahoma
bank, to compel payments from the Depositors' Guaranty Fund, established
by the legislature of the state. Held: This was a suit against the state, and,
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under the Eleventh Amendment, could not be maintained in the Federal Court.
Lankford et at. v. Platte Iron Works Company, 235 U. S. 46r (1915).
The Constitution was early interpreted as authorizing a suit against a
state by an individual of another state in the federal courts. Chisholm v.
Georgia, z Dallas 419 (U. S. 1793). This decision led to the passage of thfe
Eleventh Amendment in 1798, which prohibits such suits. It was at first held
that the state had to be the nominal party in order to be immune from suit
under the amendment. Osborn v. Bank, 9 Wheat. 738 (U. S. x824). But this
rule was soon abandoned, and the question now is whether the state is thd
real party defendant and the court will go behind the mere formal parties to
ascertain this. Hagood v. Southern, 117 U. S. 52 (i886). The principal case
is in accord with the decisions in holding that when an officer of the state is
sued to compel affirmative action, involving discretion, in pursuance of a
statute, that this is in effect a suit against the state and cannot be maintained
in the federal courts. Hagood v. Southern, supra; Louisiana v. Jumel, 1o7
U. S. 711 (1882); Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U. S. i5o (i9o9). The
state, however, may waive this immunity from suit under the Eleventh Amend-
ment. Clark v. Barnard, 1o8 U. S. 436 (1882). But these cases are to be
distinguished from those where the relief sought is the performance of a
plain official duty, requiring no exercise of discretion, or where state officers
under color of a state authority which is unconstitutional have invaded and
violated personal and property rights, in which cases an action against the
officer to restrain him from proceeding under any authority granted by such
statute is not considered an action against the state. The Virginia Coupon
Cases, 114 U. S. 269 (1884) ; Prout v. Starr, x88 U. S. 537 (i9o3) ; Smythe v.
Ames, 169 U. S. 466 (I8W8).
CORPORATIONS-STocKHOLDERS' LIABILITY-SuBscRIPTION TO STocK-Stock,
part as a bonus, was issued to one who accepted and receipted for it, but
made no formal subscription. A creditor of the corporation sued to hold him
liable, as a stockholder, to the amount of the face value of the stock. Held:
He was liable as a stockholder. Sullivan v. Farnsworth, I79 S. W. 317 (Tenn.
1915).
It is generally held that a formal subscription is unnecessary to make a
stockholder liable when he receipts for, accepts and holds the certificates.
Harrison v. Heathorn. 6 Man. & G. 8i (Eng. 1843); Clevenger v. Moore, 71
N. J. L. 148 (I9O3). The contract of subscription may be a parol one.
Cookney's Case, 3 De G. & J. 170 (Eng. 1858); Somerset Co.'s Receiver v.
Adams, 72 S. W. 1125 (Ky. 19o3) ; I Cook on Corporations, sec. 52. In Eng-
land three things are necessary to bind one as a stockholder: application,
allotment, and notice of the allotment. Re Northern Mfg. Co., 63 L. T. 369
(Eng. i89O). A mere acceptance, even though the stock is a bonus, is suffi-
cient subscription and creates a liability. French v. Busch, i89 Fed. 480
19ii) ; Sullivan v. Farnsworth, supra; Thompson: Liability of Stockholders,
sec. io5. In most jurisdictions unpaid subscriptions are liable for corporate
debts, only after the remedy against the corporation has been exhausted.
Handy v. Draper, 89 N. Y. 334 (1882); Burch v. Taylor, I Wash. 245 (1890).
Contra. Parmelee v. Price, 2o8 Ill. 544 (1904). But if the corporation is
bankrupt, stockholders may be sued at once. Knight Co. v. Brick Co., 46 So.
285 (Fla. i9o8) ; Shellington v. Howland, 53 N. Y. 371 (1833). In some states
a creditor who is also a stockholder, may sue his co-stockholder. Knowles v.
Sandercock, IO7 Cal. 629 (1895); Fowler v. Robinson, 31 Me. 189 (i85o);
Mendenhall v. Duluth Co., 72 Minn. 312 (I86). But the weight of authority
seems against this practice. Thompson v. Meisser, io8 Ill. 359 (1884) ; Thayer
v. Union Tool Co., 70 Mass. 75 (1855); Mathez v. Neidig, 72 N. Y. ioo (1878).
As in the case of unpaid subscriptions, stockholders are liable only after
remedy against the corporation is exhausted, in most jurisdictions. Globe
Pub. Co. v. State Bank, 41 Neb. 175 (i894) ; Mean's Appeal, 85 Pa. 75 (1877) ;
Allen v. Arnold, i8 R. I. 809 (1895). There are, however, some jurisdictions
holding contra to this. Culver v. Third Nat'l Bank, 64 Ill. 528 (1871) ; Bird
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Co. v. Calvert, 22 S. C. 292 (1884). Generally, stockholders are liable only
for the value of their stock; and statutes extending their liability will be
construed very strictly. Brunswick Co. v. Nat'l Bank, 192 U. S. 386 (1904);
Moyer v. Penna. Slate Co., 71 Pa. 293 (1872).
CRIMINAL LAW-USE OF MAILS To DEFRAUD--The president of a corpora-
tion mailed a false statement of the corporation's financial condition to another
company for the purpose of borrowing money and was indicted and convicted
under section 215 of the Criminal Code of the United States (Act March 4,
1909, C. 321) 35 Stat. 1130 (Comp. St. 1913, p. I0385). Held: He was
properly convicted. Bettman v. U. S., 224 Fed. 819 (1915).
Section 215 of the Code reads as follows: "Whoever, having devised or
intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money
under false pretences, shall for the purpose of executing such scheme, place
any letter, writing or advertisement in any post office of the United States....
shall be punished . . . ." Under the original statute (June 8, 1872, 17 Stat.
323), the words "scheme" and "artifice' were held to embrace only "swindling
devices smacking of the confidence game." Hess v. U. S., 124 U. S. 485 (1887).
By the amendment of March 2, 1889 (25 Stat. 873), its scope was expanded
to reach all classes of individuals who use the fiails for fraudulent pur-
poses. Scheinberg v. U. S., 213 Fed. 759 (1914)-/ The federal courts have
not, however, been uniform in their interpretation of the statute. The majority
of the decisions seem to hold with the principal case that the term "artifice"
includes fraud practiced in the prosecution of legitimate business, as well as
devices inherently dishonest. Harrison v. U. S., 2oo Fed. 662 (1912) ; U. S. v.
Steven, 222 U. S. 167 (1911) ; and that a scheme to defraud is not necessary,
if there is intent to defraud. O'Hara v. U. S., I29 Fed. 551 (I9o4). The
all-embracing scope of the statute is indicated in Durland v. U. S., i6i U. S.
3o6, 313 (1896), and Foster v. U. S., 178 Fed. I65, 172 (910). It includes
schemes designed to defraud specific individuals as well as those calculated to
trap the public or the credulous generally. Horman v. U. S., II6 Fed. 350
(I9o2) (affirmed in 187 U. S. 641, 192) ; Weber v. U. S., 62 Fed. 740 (1894).
It embraces also devices where the use of the mails is only incidental. Brown
v. U. S., 143 Fed. 6o (I9o6). There must be, however, an intent to defraud,
and good faith in a scheme, no matter how preposterous, is a good defense.
U. S. v. Post, 135 Fed. I (I9o5). The scheme, too, must be plausible, and
calculated to deceive persons of ordinary comprehension; a manifest hoax or
humbug is not indictable. U. S. v. Fay, 83 Fed. 839 (1897). On the other
hand, a minority of the federal cases hold that the word "scheme" applies
only to "cunningly devised plans that beget confidence . . . ." U. S. v. Hess,
124 U. S. 486 (Y887) (decided before the amendment to the statute) ; U. S. v.
Post, ii3 Fed. 852 (1902); Etheredge v. U. S., i86 Fed. 434 (1911). But the
word "artifice" has been used to denote something more than the mailing of
the letter with a fraudulent intent. Etheredge v. U. S., supra. These cases
are directly contra to the principal case.
DIvoRcE-DESFmTIoN-CoNsENT TO SEPARATION-In pursuance of an ante-
nuptial arrangement, a wife absented herself from the husband's home for
extended periods to care for her invalid mother. Held: The husband could
not regard such absence as desertion and giound for divorce unless he gave
her due notice that he would no longer abide by the ante-nuptial arrangement.
Croll v. Croll, 6o Pa. Superior Ct. 415 (I915).
Desertion is an actual abandonment of matrimonial cohabitation, with an
intent to desert, willfully and maliciously persisted in, without cause, for the
statutory period. Ingersoll v. Ingersoll, 49 Pa. 249 (1865) ; Rose v. Rose, 50
Mich. 92 (1883). It will be seen that the intent to desert is essential, and the
mere fact that the parties do not live together does not give rise to the infer-
ence of desertion. The husband may consent, either expressly or by implica-
tion, to the wife's continued absence, but unless he revokes such consent the
absence will not be considered as desertion in divorce proceedings. Simpson
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v. Simpson, 31 Mo. 24 (i86o); Moores v. Moores, 16 N. J. Eq. 275 (1863).
Even where there are written articles of separation the consent may be with-
drawn. In this respect the general American law resembles that of England,
allowing a suit for the restoration of conjugal rights. Moores v. Moores,
supra; Earl of Westmeath v. Countess of Westmeath, 2 Hagg. Eccl. Rep.
Supp. (Eng. 1826). But where the assent to the separation is withdrawn,
there must be a bona fide attempt at reconciliation, and the refusal of a mere
formal request to return unaccompanied by evidence of a real desire to resume
marital relations will not be considered as desertion. McIlhaney v. McIlhaney,
125 Iowa 333 (19o4); Hankinson v. Hankinson, 33 N. J. Eq. 66 (i88o).
EVIDENCE-PRESUMPTION OF SuRvlvoRsIP-A husband and wife in their
wills named each other as primary beneficiary, with the provisos that if one
died before the other their foster son should be the sole beneficiary. Both
were frozen to death in the same snowstorm and evidence was lacking as to
which died first. Held: The wills should be read as though containing only
the bequest to the son, such being the evident intention of the parties and
there being no presumption as to survivorship or simultaneous death. Fitz-
gerald, et aL., v. Ayres, et al., 179 S. W. 289 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915).
The civil law indulged in various presumptions as to the survivorship
between persons who perished in the same disaster, based upon the age, sex,
and physical strength of the individuals, and the assumption that the stronger
would survive the weaker. Newell v. Nichols, 75 N. Y. App. 78 (1878). In
California and Louisiana such presumptions have been established by statute.
Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1963; La. Civ. Code, Arts. 936-939. At common law,
however, and in all other American states, there is no presumption as to
survivorship. It is a fact to be proved by the party asserting it. Fuller v.
Linzee, 135 Mass. 468 (1883) ; Johnson v. Merithew, 8o Me. iii (1888) ; Sup.
Council of Royal Arcanum v. Kacer, 69 S. W. 671 (Mo. 19o2). Likewise
there is no presumption as to simultaneous death. Johnson v. Merithew, supra;
Cowman v. Rogers, 73 Md. 403 (1891); Dunn v. New Amsterdam Cas.
Co., 126 N. Y. Supp. 229 (19Ol). But there are a few cases contra. Kansas
Pac. R. Co. v. Miller, 2 Colo. 442 (1874); Balder v. Middeke, 92 I1. App. 227
(19o2). However this may be, it is certain that in such a case the courts will
dispose of the property as though death occurred at the same time. Young
Women's Christian Home v. French, 187 U. S. 401 (19o3); It re Wilbor, 2o
R. I. 126 (1897) ; Underwood v. Wing, 24 L. J. Ch. N. S. 293 (Eng. 1855).
EVIDENCE-PREvIOUs ACTS-SPARKS FROM LOc mOTIvEs-In an action
against a railroad company for the destruction of a house by fire, it was
proved that a locomotive had passed just previous to the fire; and testimony
was offered to prove that engines vhich passed the day before had emitted
large sparks. Held: The testimony offered should have been excluded. Moose
v. M. K. & T. Rwy. Co., 179 S. W. 75 (Tex. 1915).
Although the fact that a fire was caused by a passing engine may be
proved circumstantially, the mere fact that an engine passed the house shortly
before the fire was discovered, is not sufficient to raise an issue for the jury.
Funk v. Railway Co., 100 S. W. 504 (Mo. 19o7); Railway Co. v. Sadieville
Mfg. Co., 137 Ky. 568 (191o). Nor is it sufficient to show a mere possibility
or conjecture that the fire was started by one of the defendant company's
engines. Minneapolis Sash & Door Co. v. Great Northern Rwy. Co., 83 Minn.
370 (190). So also evidence that on the day and near the time of the fire,
the same engine threw out sparks is admissible. Lake Erie & W. R. Co. V.
Middlecoff, 15o IIl. 27 (1893); Jacobs v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 167
N. Y. App. Div. 134 (9o5). Under similar circumstances, except that the
identity of the engine which caused the fire cannot be established, evidence
of the setting of other fires, by locomotives of the company at other near
times and places, is competent. Shelly v. P. & R. Rwy. Co., 211 Pa. 16o (igo5) ;
Lake St. El. R. Co. v. Peterson, 93 Ill. App. 118 (i9ox). Where the engine
which alone could have set fire, is identified, testimony that other engines set
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fires or threw sparks at other times is incompetent. Lesser Cotton Co. v. St,
L. I. M. & S. Rwy. Co., 114 Fed. 133 (1902); First National Bank v. Lake
Erie & W. R. Co., 174 Ill. 36 (1895).
INSURANCE-CONSTRUCTION OF POLCY-CONDITION-The holder of a life
insurance policy which contained the condition that it did not insure against
death caused by anything inhaled, was found dead in a room with the gas
turned on. Held: Death was caused by "anything inhaled" within the
meaning of the condition, there being nothing to show that those words were
intended to mean anything voluntarily inhaled. In re United L. & S. Ins. Co.,
113 L. T. 4o7 (Eng. 1915).
There are very few decisions of the English courts to be found on this
point and these do not seem conclusive. The doctrine that policies are to be
construed contra proferentes, where the meaning is clearly ambiguous, has
been applied, In re Arbitration between Bradley and Essex & Suffolk Acc. In.
Soc., 1O5 L. T. gig (Eng. 1912) ; but see Cole v. Acc. Ins. Co., 5 L. T. 736
(Eng. I86i), where such language was held to be clear and accordingly no
recovery was allowed.
In America there has been much difference of opinion as to the meaning of
such conditions. The words "inhaling gas" have been held to imply a con-
scious and voluntary act done with knowledge of the nature of the substance
inhaled. Travellers' v. Dunlop, 16o Ill. 642 (18g6); Menneiley v. Employers'
Liability, 148 N. Y. 596 (1896) ; Pickett v. Ins. Co., 144 Pa. 9o (i8g). But
this view has been disapproved in the federal courts. McGlother v. Provident
Ins. Co., 32 C. C. A. 318 (1898) ; Ry. Mail Ass'n v. Dent, 213 Fed. 983 (1914).
See also Macgillivray on Insurance, p. 954. It is well settled, however, that a
policy, excluding injuries from "anything accidentally or otherwise inhaled,"
is to be construed strictly against the assured. Richardson v. Travellers, 46
Fed. 843 (1891); Preferred Acc. Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 45 Fla. 525 (19o3);
Fidelity v. Waterman, I61 Ill. 635 (1896).
INSURANCE-POLICY PAYABLE TO MORTGAGEE-WHO MAY SUE-A fire in-
surance policy was made payable to a mortgagee "as his interest might appear."
Held: Either the mortgagor or the mortgagee could maintain an action in his
own name to recover to the extent of his interest. Swaine v. Teutonia Fire
Ins. Co., 1o9 N. E. 825 (Mass. 1915).
There is a conflict of decisions as to the proper party to maintain an action
on an insurance policy, which is payable to a mortgagee. Where the claim
of the mortgagee exceeds the amount of the insurance, the weight of authority
is that he is the proper party to sue. Motley v. Ins. Co., 29 Me. 337 (1849) ;
Smith v. Union Ins. Co., 25 R. I. 260 (igo3); Ins. Co. v. Jones, 128 Ala. 361
(19oo). Under those circumstances, the mortgagor can only sue if the mort-
gagee consents, or after the mortgage debt has been paid. Turner v. Ins. Co.,
iO9 Mass. 568 (1872) ; Coates v. Ins. Co., 58 Md. 172 (1881). On the other
hand, where the mortgagee's claim is for less than the amount due on the
policy, the mortgagor is the proper party. Ins. Co. v. Felrath, 77 Ala. 194
(1884) ; Carberry v. German Ins. Co., 86 Wis. 323 (1893). But the later cases
are contrary to this rule. Loan Ass'n v. Ins. Co., 28 Pa. Super. Ct. 314I
(Igo5) ; Bacot v. Ins. Co., 5o So. 729 (Miss. 19o). Some cases allow the
mortgagee to sue in the mortgagor's name. Ins. Co. v. Peterson, 187 Ill. 395
(19oo). The rule in Massachusetts is given in the principal case, following
Savings Bank v. Ins. Co., 166 Mass. 195 (1896). The last rule, which allows
the mortgagor and the mortgagee to join in the same action on the ground of
a common interest in the subject matter, goes directly into the teeth of the
common law procedure, which made a joint interest in the whole of the re-
covery essential to a joint action at law, but is in accord with the theory of
joinder of parties under the codes which have borrowed the rules of equity.
Home Ins. Co. v. Gilman, 112 Ind. 7 (1887) ; Winne v. Fire Ins. Co., g N. Y.
185 (1883); Williamson v. Ins. Co., 86 Wis. 393 (1893).
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LANDLORD AND TENANT-CONSTRUCTION OF LEAsE-A lease described the
property demised as all of a hotel building with appurtenances. A door
giving access to the rear of the demised premises over other property owned
by the landlord was closed by a brick wall built by the landlord as an
extension to the adjoining house. Held: The door and passage way were
appurtenant to the demised premises, and the landlord's act was a breach of
his covenant for quiet enjoyment. Cohen v. Newman, 155 N. Y. Supp. 30
(1915).
The word "appurtenance" will usually be construed in connection with
the principal thing conveyed, with regard also to the general intent apparent
in the instrument in which it was employed as evidenced by the context and
all the circumstances. Missouri Pac. Rwy. Co. v. Moffitt, 94 Mo. 56 (1887);
Riddle v. Littlefield, 53 N. H. 503 (1873). So the use to which the premises
demised are to be put is generally material in determining the meaning of
the word, but such use is not conclusive. It is held that the conveyance of
land with appurtenances will not create a right of way over other land of
the grantor unless such way is absolutely necessary to give the grantee
access to his land. May v. Smith, 3 Mackey 55 (D. C., 1884); Grant v.
Chase, 17 Mass. 443 (1821); Oliver v. Hook, 47 Md. 3oi (1877). On the
other hand it has been said that "appurtenances" may -not only be sufficient
to convey an existing easement, but also to create one. Peck v. Loyd, 38
Conn. 566 (i8yI); Railroad v. Ward, 128 I1. 349 (1889). But the general
rule seems to be that the word appurtenances will only carry with it that which
is reasonably necessary to the beneficial enjoyment of the property con-
veyed and the use to which it is to be put, and will not carry with it that
which is a mere convenience even though the lessor had used it for the same
business. Oliver v. Dickinson, ioo Mass. 114 (1868) ; Barrett v. Bell, 82 Mo.
11o (1884); Doyle v. Lord, 64 N. Y. 432 (1876).
In the principal case the majority of the court applied the rule that a
lease is lo be construed most strongly against the lessor who made it, and
that as the door and way had been used by the lessor for the hotel business,
it passed as appurtenant. It is submitted that the dissenting opinion is more
in accord with the weight of authority.
MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION Acr-AwAR ON
HEARSAY EVIDENCE-A Workmen's Compensation Commission made an award
based on statements of the deceased workman as to the cause of the injury.
The act provided that the commission "shall not be bound by common law
or statutory rules of evidence or by technical or formal rules of procedure."
Held: An award on hearsay evidence was valid. Carroll v. Knickerbocker
Ice Co., i55 N. Y. S. I (1915).
Under the English procedure statements made by the deceased, as to
his bodily or mental feelings are admissible, but those made as to the cause
of his illness are not admissible in evidence. Grilby v. Great Western Rail-
way Co., 102 L. T. 202 (Eng. igio). Contra: Wright v. Kerrigan, 45 Ir. L.
T. 82 (Ireland, 19II), (semble). Where there is no other evidence of the
accident than such declarations the award will not be sustained. Wolsey v.
Pethick Bros., i B. W. C. C. 411 (Eng. 19o8); Amys v. Barton [1912] I K.
B. 40 (Eng.). It has been held where there was other evidence, that the
admission of such declaration as to the cause of the injury was ground for
reversal. Smith v. Hardman & Holden, Lt., 6 B. W. C. C. 719 (Eng. 1913).
The California Act authorizes the commission to disregard "technical
rules" of evidence, but a conclusion opposite to that in the principal case
was reached in Englebretson v. Industrial Accident Commission, 151 Pac.
421 (Cal. 1915) and Employers' Assur. Corporation, Ld., v. Industrial Acci-
dent Commission, 151 Pac. 423 (Cal. 1915). A Michigan case took the
same view but sustained a finding made after the admission of such declara-
tions, where there was other competent evidence. Reck v. Whittlesberger,
148 N. W. 247 (Mich. 1914). In a New Jersey case deciding another ques-
tion, it was held that certain directions of the court should be based "on
specific findings of fact supported by legal evidence." Under a statute of
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Massachusetts permitting the admission of declarations of a deceased person
before a "court," it was held that the industrial board should be guided
and controlled by the same general principles which would govern judicial
officers in discharging the same duties. Pigeon's Case, 216 Mass. 51 (1913).
MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION Acr-DoES A HOmi-
CIDE ARISE IN THE COURSE OF THE EMPLOYENT?-A mill superintendent
was shot and killed by a trespasser whom he was ordering from the premises,
and whom he had been specially warned to order out. Held: The injury
was one arising out of and in the course of the employment In re Reithel,
1o9 N. E. 951 (Mass. 1915).
An injury "arises out of the employment" when there is apparent to the
rational mind, upon consideration of all the circumstances, a casual con-
nection between the conditions under which the work is required to be per-
formed and the resulting injury. The injury is "in the course of the em-
ployment" when it occurs while the workman is doing the duty which he is
employed to perform. McNicol's Case, Z15 Mass. 497 (1913). Under most
of the acts in force, both elements are necessary. McNicol's Case, stpra;
Bryant v. Fissell, 84 N. J. L. 72 (1913); Hills v. Blair, 148 N. W. 243
(Mich. I914). The burden of producing evidence to show that the injury
arose out of and in the course of the employment rests on the claimant.
McCoy v. Michigan Screw Co., 147 N. W. 572 (Mich. 1914); Bryant v.
Fissell, supra. Under some of the acts the injury must also result from
an "accident," i. e., an unlooked for, and untoward event, not expected or
designed. Bryant v. Fissell, supra; Poccardi v. Public Service Commission,
84 S. E. 242 (W. Va. 1915). The decisions are sometimes difficult to recon-
cile, and have been influenced to no small degree by the English decisions.
See Thorn v. Humm & Co., 112 L. T. 888 (Eng. 1915), and cases cited in
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It will be noted that the Pennsylvania Act of 1915 applies only to "an
injury by an accident in the course of his employment," no mention being
made of the usual "arising out of." Act of June 2, 1915, P. L. 738.
MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-REFUSAL TO
SUBMIT TO OPERATIN-An injured workman refused to submit to an operation
which was common and almost always successful, although attended with some
danger to life. Compensation was allowed on the basis that the disability
was temporary. Held: The refusal was reasonable and the award should
have been on the basis of a permanent disability. McNally v. Hudson & M.
R. Co., 95 Atl. 122 (N. J. 1915).
When an injured workman refuses to submit to an operation, two ques-
tions arise. First, was the refusal unreasonable? This is uniformly held
to be a question of fact. Ruabon Coal Co. v. Thomas, 3 B. W. C. C. 32
(Eng. I9IO); Jendrus v. Detroit Steel Products Co., 144 N. W. 563 (Mich.
I914.) The question is whether the refusal was unreasonable, not whether,
on the balance of the medical testimony, the operation was reasonably safe.
Tutton v. Owners of S. S. Majestic, 2 K. B. 54 (Eng. i9o9). So, if the
operation involves risk of life, the refusal is not unreasonable. Rothwell v.
Davies, ig T. L. R. 423 (Eng. 19o3); Tutton v. Owners of S. S. Majestic,
supra; Ruabon Coal Co. v. Thomas, supra.
Secondly, where the refusal is unreasonable, the test is whether the
continued disability is the result of the refusal or the original injury. Mar-
shall v. Orient Steam Navigation Co., Ld., ioi L. T. 584 (Eng. i9io);
Floccher v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., io8 N. E. IO32 (Mass. 1915).
If unreasonable refusal to submit to an operation is the cause of the con-
tinued incapacity, the workman is precluded from the right to further com-
pensation. O'Neill v. Brown & Co., Ld. [1913] S. C. 653 (Scot.); Walsh
v. Lack & Co. (Newland) Ld., no L. T. 452 (Eng. 1914).
PARTNERSHIP-COMPENSATION FOR EXTRA SERVICES-A partner was sole
manager of a business for three years, during the disability of his co-partners.
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Held: He was entitled to no extra compensation for attending to firm busi-
ness. Cole v. Cole, 177 S. W. gS (Ark. 1915).
The general rule is that a partner is not entitled to any compensation
for services rendered to the partnership, further than his share in the
profits, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary. Neville v. Mining
Co., 135 Cal. 561 (i9o2) ; Street v. Thompson, 229 Ill. 613 (igo7). The rule
applies irrespective of the inequality of services rendered, compared with
those rendered by the co-partners. Marsh's Appeal, 69 Pa. 30 (1871). It
also applies to a surviving partner in winding up the affairs of the business.
Schenkl v. Dana, 178 Mass. 236 (1875). A managing partner, although
he attends exclusively to the business, receives no extra compensation. Evans
v. Warner, 20 App. Div. 230 (N. Y. 1897). According to the principal case,
the sickness or other disability of a partner is one of the risks incidental to
the business.
Where there is an express stipulation in the partnership agreement, a
partner will of course be entitled to extra compensation. Garwood v. Payn-
ter, L. R. I Ch. Div. 236 (Eng. 19o3); McCullough v. Barr, 145 Pa. 459
(1891). Moreover, the law may imply an agreement to pay a partner for
services under certain circumstances. Mondanim Bank v. Burke, 147 N. W.
148 (Iowa 1914); Williams v. Knibbs, 213 Mass. 534 (1913); Zell's Appeal,
126 Pa. 329 (1889). A partner who performs beneficial services in a capacity
other than that of partner is of course entitled to pay. Parker v. Day, 155
N. Y. 383 (1898). See also: Morris v. Griffin, 83 Iowa, 327 (1891).
PATENTs-RIGHT OF PURCHASE TO MAKE IMPROVEMENTS-An article man-
ufactured under a patent was sold and the purchaser made certain improve-
ments. Held: The article became his property and he could improve it.
Burguiercs Co. v. Deming Co., 224 Fed. 956 (1915).
One who buys a patented article becomes the owner thereof and can do
with it as he sees fit. Chaffee v. Boston Belting Co., 22 How. 217 (U. S.
1859). Under the guise of repair or improvement, however, the vendee
cannot practically reconstruct the patented article. Shickle H. & H. Iron
Co. v. St Louis Car-Coupler Co., 77 Fed. 739 (1896); American Cotton Tie
Co. v. Simmons, io6 U. S. 89 (1882). The vendee cannot replace the vital
and essential part of the patent. Morrin v. White Engineering Works, 138
Fed. 68 (19o5). For a summary of the rules as to repair, improvement,
replacement and reconstruction of patented articles, see Morrin v. White
Engineering Works, supra. The principal case contains a good summary of
the general rules and is valuable as demonstrative of their application to a
particular set of facts.
PLEADING-DENIAL ON INFORMATION AND BELIEF-In an action for in-
demnity in which the plaintiff alleged a judgment against him by the Su-
preme Court of British Columbia, the defendant denied upon information
and belief. He.'-: As the matter of record was in a foreign country, and
not within the presumptive knowledge of the defendant, the form of the
denial was good. Surety Co. v. Sandberg, 225 Fed. 150 (1915).
The distinction observed in determining whether or not a defendant
may avail himself of this form of denial, is to inquire whether the facts
alleged are presumptively within his knowledge. Rochkind v. Perlman, 123
App. Div. 808 (N. Y. 19o8). If they are, he cannot avail himself of a
denial on information and belief. A pleader's own acts, in the absence of
special circumstances, are held to be within his knowledge and this form of
denial insufficient, Gribble v. Brewing Co., ioo Cal. 67 (1893); likewise the
making of agreements and contracts by him, Raymond v. Johnston, 17 Wash.
232 (1897) ; and the sale of goods to him, Weill & Co. v. Crittenden, 139 Cal.
488 (i9o3). Denials of indebtedness upon information and belief are insuf-
ficient. Thompson v. Seligman, 9o Fed. 219 (I8W8). Where the matters
involved are tonnected with the duties of public officers, generally this form
of denial is not permitted. McConoughey v. Jackson, ioi Cal. 1265 (1894).
A city is generally held to have positive knowledge as to matters clearly
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within the knowledge of its officers, and cannot use this denial. Phila. v.
Pierson, 211 Pa. 388 (19o5). Matters appearing of public record cannot as
a rule be denied upon information and belief, Peacock v. United States, 125
Fed. 583 (1903). So a pleader is held to have presumptive knowledge of
deeds and mortgages of record, Goodell v. Blumer, 41 Wis. 436 (1876);
of recorded liens, Oakes v. Ziemer, 62 Neb. 6o3 (19O1); of assessments of
taxes, Wickersham v. Russell, 51 Pa. 71 (1865); of a judgment and all
other court records to which he is a party. First Bank v. Watt, 7 Idaho
510 (i9Oi); Steinberg v. Saltzman, 130 Wis. 419 (i9o7). Denial on infor-
mation and belief of the plaintiff's incorporation raises no issue, Fuller Co.
v. Manhattan Co., 88 N. Y. Supp. 1049 (19o4). Nor can a corporation use
this form of denial when the matters alleged were presumptively within
the knowledge of any of its officers, Sloan v. California Ry. Co., III Cal.
668 (1896). The substance of the cases is that a denial on information and
belief of facts which are actually or presumptively within the pleader's
knowledge is insufficient and will be treated as an evasion. Avery v. Stew-
art, 134 N. C. 287 (1904). Matters of public record are presumptively
within the knowledge of defendant because of their accessibility. Peacock v.
U. S., m.pra; obviously this reason is not applicable to matters of foreign
record.
PROPERTY-EASEMENT-RIGHT TO ICE ON ADJOINING LAND CAUSED BY
OvFFLow-The owner of a mill dam, with an easement of flowage over
adjoining property claimed the right to take the ice formed thereby on the
other land. Held: The ice belonged to the owner of the land exclusively.
Valentino v. Schantz, 1O9 N. E. 866 (N. Y. 1915).
The right to maintain a mill dam and exercise the privileges belonging
thereto, does not of itself confer the right to take ice formed by the flow-
age. Julien v. Woodsmall, 82 Ind. 568 (1882). Ice which forms on streams
or ponds, the bed of which is subject to private ownership, belongs to the%
owner of such bed, and such owner may maintain trespass for its removal.
Reysen v. Roate, 92 Wis. 543 (1896). The right to take ice grows out of
the title to the bed of the stream or pond, and not out of the causation of.
the flowage. Bigelow v. Shaw, 65 Mich. 341 (1887) ; Searle v. Gardner, 13
Atl. 835 (Pa. 1888). However an upper riparian proprietor over whose
land a mill owner has an easement of fiowage, may not make such use of
the stream, by taking ice, or otherwise, as to interfere with the successful
operation of the mill. Howe v. Andrews, 62 Conn. 398 (1892).
There is a class of cases in which it has been held that one who does
not hold title to the bed of a pond, may nevertheless acquire by prescrip-
tion, the right to take ice therefrom as a profit a prendre or easement ap-
purtenant to land. Hinckel v. Stevens, I65 N. Y. 171 (igoo). The right
to cut ice on a "great pond" (ten acres or more), is a public one in which
the riparian proprietors have no greater interest than any one else. Bras-
tow v. Rockport Ice Co., 77 Me. ioo (1885).
PUnLIC SERVICE CORPORATIONS-CONTRACT WITH MUNICIPALITIES-RIGHT
OF CONSUMER TO SuE-A gas company was granted permission by a town
board to lay its pipes in the highways of the town, on the condition that it
would not charge the inhabitants more than a certain rate for gas. Held: The
contract was enforcible by the inhabitants of the town. Farnsworth v. Gas
Co., iO9 N. E. 86o (N. Y. 1915).
The right of a private consumer to sue a public service corporation in
his own name to enforce rights accruing to him under a, contract between
the city and the corporation fixing the maximum rates to be charged, was
squarely held in Pond v. New Rochelle Water Co., 183 N. Y. 330 (I9o6).
and was based on the doctrine of Lawrence v. Fox, 2o N. Y. 268 (1859), that
the contract had been made for the sole benefit of the consumer. But it has
been held that a private citizen has no such right to sue. Cleburne Water
Co. v. Cleburne, 13 Tex. Civ. App. 141 (1896). In several cases, contracts
made by a city with public service corporations have been enforced at the
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suit of private consumers without any discussion as to their right to sue. Thus
a consumer has been allowed to recover the amount he had paid in excess
of the rates contracted for between the city and a water company, Birming-
ham Water Works v. Truss, 135 Ala. 503 (19o3); and a ciurch has been
permitted to compel a company to supply it with free water in performance
of its contract with the city, M. E. Uhurch v. Water Co., io Ohio Cir. Dec.
648 (19oo). It has been held that a private consumer is entitled to an in-
junction restraining the company from coercing him into paying a higher
rate than that fixed by the contract between the company and the city, Smith
v. Birmingham Water Works, 1o4 Ala. 315 (1893); Robbins v. Bangor Co.,
100 Me. 496 (19o5) ; or that fixed by the company's charter, Ernst v. Water
Works, 39 La. Ann. 550 (1887) ; or by a city ordinance, Rogers Park Water
Co. v. Fergus, 178 il. 571 (899).
The principal case seems to conflict with the doctrine of Allen, etc.,
Mfg. Co. v. Water Works, 113 La. io9i (1905), which held, in accord with
the great weight of authority, that a water company under contract with the
city to supply water for use at fires, was not liable to suit by a private citi-
zen for loss sustained through failure to fulfill its contract. North Carolina
and Kentucky are contra to this latter doctrine and hold the company
liable to a citizen for fire loss, on the ground that the contract was made by
the municipality as agent of the citizen, who furnished the consideration by
paying the taxes. Gorrell v. Greensboro Water Co., 124 N. C. 328 (1899).
it is submitted that this would have been a better basis for the doctrine in
the principal case.
SALES-RIGHT OF A'ROvAL-DFaLA&-Over four months after the sale
of a planer on approval, for sixty days, the vendor brought replevin for the
machine against the purchaser at sheriff's sale, the vendee having gone into
bankruptcy. Held: By the delay of the vendor he lost his right to reclaim
the property. McCabe v. Northampton Trust Co., 60 Pa. Super. Ct. 18
(915).
in a sale on approval title passes to the buyer if he fails to exercise
his option within the time specified by the contract. Moline M. & S. Co. v.
Pereau, 52 Neb. 577 (1897); Geiser Mfg. v. Taylor, 55 App. Div. 638 (N.
Y. 190o), or, if the contract does not fix a time, within a reasonable time. Cook
v. Gross, 60 App. Div. 446 (N. Y. 19oi); Washington v. Johnson, 7 Humph.
468 (Tenn. 1846). If the contract fixes a period for trial, the purchaser has
a reasonable time after its expiration, in which to reject the article. Spring-
field Engine Stop Co. v. Sharp, 184 Mass. 266 (1903) ; Waters Heater Co. v.
Mansfield, 48 Vt. 378 (1875); Kahn v. Klabunde, 50 Wis. 235 (188o). Fail-
ure to act within such time constitutes an acceptance. Charter Gas & Engine
Co. v. Barton, 39 So. 985 (Ala. io5); Turner v. Muskegon Mach. & Foundry
Co., 97 Mich. i66 (1893). Continued use of the article after the period fixed
for trial operates as an acceptance, American Electric Teleph. Co. v. Em-
poria Teleph. Co., 83 Kan. 64 (igio); Scott v. Vulcan Iron Wks., 31 Okla.
334 (1912), even after a declaration of dissatisfaction. Wolf Co. v. Monarch
Refrigerating Co., 252 Ill. 491 (1914); Aultman v. Theirer, 34 Iowa 272
(1872); Empire Steam Pump Co. v. Inman, 12 N. Y. Supp. 948 (i8gi). The
same condition of facts which will hold the buyer in an action against him.
for the price, will establish his title in a replevin suit by the vendor. Hick-
man v. Shimp, log Pa. 16 (1885). See Sales Act, § ig, Rule 3, (2) (b).
SuPRrvsip-DscaARGE OF SU.TY-SuuRENDER OF COLLATERAL SECURITY
-Without the consent or knowledge of the surety, the maker of a note per-
suaded the cashier of the bank which held it to surrender stock which had
been deposited as collateral. Held: The surety was discharged from all lia-
bility. Elsey v. People's Bank, 179 S. W. 392 (Ky. 1915).
The doctrine that a release of the security by the creditor discharges the
surety is not disputed in the cases. Templeton v. Shakley, l07 Pa. 370
(1884) ; Plankenton v. Gorman, 93 Wis. 56o (1896). The statement in the
principal case, however, that the surety is discharged from all liability, re-
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gardless of the value of the collateral, does not express the prevailing view,
a great majority of the states holding that the surety is released only to the
extent that he has been actually damaged. Allen v. O'Donald, 23 Fed. 573
(1885) ; Stewart v. Davis' Executor, 18 Ind. 74 (1862) ; Guild v. Butler, 127
Mass. 386 (1879). Likewise, if the security for the debt is lost through negli-
gence or want of ordinary care on the part of the creditor, the surety will
be discharged pro tanto. City Bank v. Young, 43 N. H. 457 (1862) ; Shippen's
Adm. v. Capp, 36 Pa. 89 (1859). Where the creditor is a bank and has funds
of the debtor on deposit at the maturity of the debt, a majority of the states
hold that the surety is not released if the bank fails to apply such funds
toward payment of the debt. Davenport v. State Bkg. Co., 126 Ga. 136
(19o6); National Bank v. Hill, 76 Ind. 223 (1881); National Bank v. Smith,
66 N. Y. 271 (1876). Contra Burgess v. Deposit Bank, 30 Ky. Law Rep. I77
(i9o6) ; Lawe v. Reddan, 123 Wis. 9o (1904). In Pennsylvania the rule is
that the bank must apply such deposit, provided it is not less than the amount
of the debt. First Nat. Bank v. Peltz, 176 Pa. 513 (1896).
After the creditor has actually surrendered the collateral, he cannot avoid
the consequences of his act by alleging that it was contrary to statute for him
to receive such security in the first instance. National Bank v. Stewart, 107
U. S. 676 (1882). The security must be applied upon the debt for which the
surety is bound and not upon another debt owing by the principal to thie
creditor. Brown v. First Nat. Bank, 112 Fed. goi (i9o2); Nat Exchange
Bank v. Silliman, 65 N. Y. 475 (1875). If the surety has made payment in
ignorance of the fact that the collateral has been released or lost he may re-
cover such amount from the creditor. Chester v. Bank of Kingston, 16 N. Y.
336 (1857). Likewise, if the creditor obtains a judgment and afterwards re-
leases the security, the surety may have the judgment perpetually enjoined.
McMullen v. Hinkle, 39 Miss. 142 (186o); Evans v. Raper, 74 N. C. 639
(1876).
WILs-ExEcunoN-ATrESTATION CLAusE-Three documents were brought
before the court to determine which should be admitted to probate as the
will of the deceased. The two latest ones had no attestation clause and
it appeared doubtful whether the witnesses signed at the same time. Held:
The lack of attestation clauses and the surrounding circumstances were suf-
ficient to rebut the presumption in favor of a will's due execution. In re
Strong, 112 L. T. 997 (Eng. 1915).
To be valid, a will must be executed in accordance with the law. Kelly
v. Parker, 181 Ill. (1899); Tobin v. Haack, 79 Minn. iOI (igoo). The will
must express the intent of the testator and be understood by him in its ma-
terial parts. O'Brien-v. Spalding, 1O2 Ga. 490 (1897) ; Hess's Appeal, 43 Pa.
73 (1862); In re Arneson's Will, 128 Wis. 112 (i9o6). In England and most
of the states, by statutory provision, a will must be signed by the testator or
by some one acting under his direction. Wills Act. i Vict. c. 26 (Eng. 1837) ;
Royle v. Harris, 72 L. T. 474 (Eng. 1895); Rigg v. Wilson, 13 Ill. 15 (1851);
Murry v. Hennesey, 48 Neb. 608 (1896). In Pennsylvania a will may be sus-
tained although unsigned, if testator was prevented by the extremity of his
last illness. Act of Apr. 8th, 1833, P. L. 249 s. 6; Ruoff's Appeal, 26 Pa.
219 (1856). In New Jersey the signing must be in the testator's own hand un-
less his last illness prevents. Matter of McElwaine, 18 N. J. Eq. 499 (1867).
If the signing is not in the presence of witnesses, the signature must be
acknowledged to them. White v. British Museum, 6 Bing. 310 (Eng. 1829);
Crowley v. Crowley, 80 Ill. 469 (186o) ; In re Coles, 47 Atl. 385 (N. J. 19oo).
A formal attestation clause does not seem to be essential. Roberts v. Phillips,
4 El. & BI. 450 (Eng. 185s) ; Robinson v. Brewster, 14o Ill. 649 (1892) ; but
it is prima facie evidence of compliance with all the formalities. Thompson
v. Owens, 174 Ill. 229 (1898) ; Matter of Cottrell, 95 N. Y. 329 (1884). As
to the number and necessity of witnesses, the various statutes must be con-
sulted. In Pennsylvania attesting witnesses are unnecessary, except in the case
of charitable bequests. Comb's Appeal, 1O5 Pa. is5 (1884) ; Act of Apr. 26th,
1855, P. L. 322, § II.
